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MAKING A BUSINESS OF “RESIDENTIAL USE”: THE
SHORT-TERM-RENTAL DILEMMA IN COMMON-INTEREST
COMMUNITIES
ABSTRACT
Short-term rentals of fewer than thirty days are being used with remarkable
frequency due to the staggering popularity of home-sharing sites such as Airbnb
and VRBO. At their best, short-term rentals provide a welcome alternative to the
hotel industry with cheaper rates for vacationers and simpler listing processes
for homeowners. However, as rental properties become an increasingly
attractive investment opportunity, a large number are being operated as de facto
hotels that are disrupting communities, eating up affordable housing, driving
rent prices skyward, and giving government regulators a headache.
Common-interest communities have been especially burdened by the shortterm-rental boom. Because many communities did not address rental activity in
their governing documents when they were created, they are usually forced to
either amend their governing documents or turn to the courts if they wish to
place new restrictions on short-term rentals. The former is effective but difficult
to accomplish because adding new use restrictions often requires most or all
community members to vote in favor of the changes. As for the latter, a number
of common-interest communities have argued that a “residential use”
restriction should prohibit some short-term-rental activity, but most courts have
been unwilling to entertain that argument.
This Comment proposes a solution for both complications. First, commoninterest communities need to be more cognizant of short-term rentals. A newly
formed common-interest community should clearly and precisely define what
rental activity is and is not allowed to avoid the problems that older communities
are currently facing. Existing common-interest communities should try in
earnest to amend their governing documents to do the same. This is difficult, but
not impossible, and it is preferable to costly and time-consuming litigation.
Second, courts should change how they interpret residential use restrictions.
Short-term rentals should neither be completely prohibited nor untouched under
these restrictions: When a property becomes a short-term-rental business, much
like a hotel or bed and breakfast, it is no longer a residential use, but rather a
commercial one. This interpretation prevents the most harmful short-term-rental
activity from infiltrating common-interest communities while leaving stricter
regulation up to community associations or local government. A balance of
responsibility between communities and the courts should enable common-
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interest communities to fairly and effectively regulate short-term rentals and
ease some of the burdens these rentals create.
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INTRODUCTION
The Falls at Arcadia was a lovely common-interest community,1 with rows
of idyllic, single-family detached homes fronted by perfectly manicured lawns
and pristine sand-colored mailboxes—Desert Sage, to be exact. New residents
were impressed with the community’s beautiful appearance and friendly
neighbors, but they soon became concerned by the extensive rules contained in
Arcadia’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, or CC&Rs.2
For example, move-ins had to be completed by 6 p.m. sharp, burnt-out light
bulbs had to be replaced immediately, and outdoor basketball hoops were strictly
prohibited—as was any exterior implement deemed not to be “aesthetically
pleasing.”3 Any exceptions had to be granted by the president of the community
association’s board of directors, Gene Gogolak.4 The neighbors were quick to
remind newcomers any time a rule was threatened to be broken, and they even
took it upon themselves to rectify violations from time to time.5
Mr. Gogolak took his job as association president seriously, ensuring that
the rules were followed to the letter; though exceptions were allowed, they were
never granted.6 Other association board members had aided Mr. Gogolak in his
enforcement of the CC&Rs for years, but they began to wonder if his policies
were too harsh—especially when a number of residents began to disappear.7
Eventually, a pair of federal agents discovered Gogolak’s secret: He had
recruited a ravenous Tibetan tulpa monster to enforce the CC&Rs.8
Though no existing common-interest community is actually watched over
by a murderous, supernatural being, the X-Files episode described above reflects

1
The Falls at Arcadia is a fictional common-interest community set in the universe of the X-Files
television program. It is a useful illustration of the various tropes and attitudes surrounding common-interest
communities, but in an interesting and fantastic setting. See The X-Files: Arcadia (Fox Network television
broadcast Mar. 7, 1999). See Section II.A, infra, for a definition of common-interest communities.
2
See Section II.B, infra, for a discussion of CC&Rs.
3
See The X-Files, supra note 1.
4
Id. See Part II, infra, for a discussion of community associations and their organization.
5
See The X-Files, supra note 1.
6
Id.
7
See id.
8
See id. This television depiction of common-interest communities is obviously fantastical and
sometimes inaccurate. For example, “CC&Rs” does not stand for “contracts, conditions, and restrictions,” as the
episode represents, but rather “covenants, conditions, and restrictions” (though the average X-Files viewer likely
would not know the difference). E.g., ELIZABETH A. SMITH-CHAVEZ ET AL., CAL. CIV. PRAC. REAL PROPERTY
LITIGATION § 8:16 (2017). However, the community association’s unflinching adherence to the CC&Rs reflects
the document’s status as a community’s “constitution,” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.10
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2000), and CC&Rs are indeed binding on future purchasers—they “run with the land,” see
31 C.J.S. Estates § 239 (2018).
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a common attitude about life in such communities.9 The dissemination of
homeowners association (HOA) “horror stories” has led many people, whether
or not they live in a common-interest community, to think that life in a commoninterest community is a terrible and oppressive experience.10 However, horror
stories like that depicted in the X-Files episode are misleading in two key
respects. First, many Americans find common-interest communities an
attractive form of homeownership. Second, although most cautionary tales about
common-interest communities involve governing associations abusing their
power, one of the largest contemporary threats to happiness in common-interest
communities comes from the residents themselves due to the proliferation of
short-term rentals.
Though not without their drawbacks, common-interest communities can be
an attractive form of homeownership. Due to shared resources and amenities,
“owners get more than they usually can by investment of a comparable amount
in a neighborhood where the only shared resources are those provided by public
government.”11 Indeed, millions of people have chosen this form of ownership:
In the United States, as of 2016, there were 342,000 common-interest
communities comprising 26.3 million housing units and 69 million residents—
meaning more than 1 in 5 Americans were living in a common-interest
community.12 A survey suggests that these residents were largely satisfied with
community life: 65% rated their overall experience as positive, and 22% as
neutral; 84% said that members of their community’s governing board serve the
best interests of the community; 66% said that their community’s rules “protect
and enhance property values,” and 22% said the rules have a neutral effect.13
9
See, e.g., Carol Rossetti, Comment to Kelly G. Richardson, A Note of Caution About HOAs, REALTOR
MAG (Feb. 12, 2015), http://realtormag.realtor.org/news-and-commentary/commentary/article/2015/02/notecaution-about-hoas [http://archive.is/1bLYE] (“I will never, ever own another property that has an HOA. A teepee in the desert would be better!”).
10
See, e.g., Donald Sjoerdsma, HOA Horror Stories: Homeowners Who Fought and Came Out on Top,
YAHOO! (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/hoa-horror-stories-homeowners-who-fought-andcame-171316727.html [http://archive.is/lwQs6] (aggregating several stories of homeowners who thought that
their community association was treating them unfairly); What Are Your Home-Owners Association (HOA)
Horror Stories?, REDDIT (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/17v1fx/what_are_
your_homeowners_association_hoa_horror/ [http://archive.is/EQFR6] (forum topic with 3,264 comments).
11
Susan F. French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The Next Step, 37 URB. LAW. 359,
360 (2005). Common shared amenities include “clubhouses, equestrian trails, tennis courts, playgrounds, entry
guards, and security patrols.” Id.
12
See CMTY. ASS’NS INST., NATIONAL AND STATE STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 2016: COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION DATA 1–3 (2017), https://foundation.caionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2016Stats
ReviewFBWeb.pdf (data includes homeowners associations, condominium communities, and cooperatives). In
1970, there were approximately 10,000 common-interest communities. Id. at 1.
13
See CMTY. ASS’NS INST., HOA SWEET HOA: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS REMAIN POPULAR WITH
AMERICAN HOMEOWNERS 2 (2016), https://www.caionline.org/PressReleases/Documents/HOAsweetHOA_
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The common-interest community model14 works for a large number of
Americans.
However, as Part I of this Comment will show, excessive short-term rentals,
usually facilitated by home-sharing websites,15 are a significant modern threat
to happiness in common-interest communities. Although these services allow
millions of homeowners to list their properties with ease and many more millions
of vacationers to find affordable places to rent,16 they can also be a significant
detriment to communities, or even entire cities.17 The localized ills of short-term
rentals are quite familiar to common-interest communities, especially when they
become the site of so-called de facto hotels with a heavy volume of out-of-town
guests.
Latter Parts discuss the composition of common-interest communities and
their legal relationship with short-term rentals. Part II lays out the pertinent
features of common-interest communities, especially how they are structured
and governed. Part III explores common-interest community regulation of shortterm rentals, in both its straightforward and controversial dimensions.
Ultimately, this Comment stresses the need for common-interest communities
to draft or amend their governing documents so that they clearly and precisely
address what kind and volume of rentals are permitted. This is the only way to
ensure that short-term rentals are appropriately managed according to the needs
of a particular community. Additionally, this Comment argues that courts should
interpret residential use covenants, which have been implemented by many
communities, to prohibit extraordinary short-term-rental activity where a
property is clearly a business and not a residence. This should be a last resort for
communities that cannot resolve their difficulties internally and need relief from
the most harmful short-term-rental activity.
Finally, Part IV details how state governments have fallen short in many of
their efforts to curb harmful short-term rentals and how common-interest
2016.pdf.
14
See Section II, infra.
15
E.g., AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2019); COUCHSURFING, https://www.
couchsurfing.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2019); HOMEAWAY, https://www.homeaway.com (last visited Feb. 20,
2019) (the “HomeAway family” includes a number of additional services including the popular VRBO). Airbnb
is referenced several times in this Comment due to public familiarity, the company’s success, and readily
available data.
16
See, e.g., Fast Facts, AIRBNB, https://press.airbnb.com/fast-facts (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (more than
400 million guest arrivals all-time and 5 million listings in 81,000 cities and 191 countries).
17
See Part I, infra. See generally Dayne Lee, Note, How Airbnb Short-Term Rentals Exacerbate Los
Angeles’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
229 (2016) (examining the negative externalities caused by short-term rentals in Los Angeles).
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communities are well-suited to fill in the gaps. The common-interest community
model facilitates identification and enforcement of short-term-rental regulation
violations, meaning these communities are a venue where short-term rentals may
be effectively monitored. Because a large proportion of Americans live in a
common-interest community, providing an effective framework for regulation
would be a significant step toward managing the negative externalities of shortterm rentals.
I.

THE SHORT-TERM-RENTAL DILEMMA

A “short-term rental” most commonly refers to a rental of fewer than thirty
consecutive days.18 Unlike a lease, which is a sort of “long-term rental,” a shortterm rental does not involve the grant of an estate in the land being rented.19
Rather, a short-term rental is a license, which is “an agreement which merely
entitles a party to use the land of another for a specific purpose, subject to the
management and control retained by the owner . . . .”20 The frequency of this
type of rental has increased dramatically due to websites such as Airbnb, and
although this phenomenon has its benefits, many cities and communities have
experienced serious negative externalities that can be traced to the short-termrental boom.21
Short-term rental of residential property22 is not a new practice, but never
before has it been such a ubiquitous, worldwide phenomenon. Homeowners
have long been able to rent out their properties using a professional renting
agent23 or local real estate agent,24 for example; and interval ownership or
“timesharing” can create a situation resembling a full-time short-term-rental
property if split into twelve or more occupancy interests.25 However, homesharing sites have made it easy for any owner, anywhere, to list their home for

18
The term “vacation rental” or “short-term vacation rental” may also be used. E.g., CARLSBAD, CAL.,
MUN. CODE ch. 5.60.020 (2017), http://www.qcode.us/codes/carlsbad/; SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE ch.
6.20.010(f) (2017), http://www.qcode.us/codes/santamonica/.
19
See 49 AM. JUR. 2D LANDLORD & TENANT § 20 (2d ed. 2018); DAVID MCADAM, THE RIGHTS, DUTIES,
REMEDIES, AND INCIDENTS BELONGING TO AND GROWING OUT OF THE RELATION OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 64 (Roy T. Ambert ed., 5th ed. 1934).
20
49 AM. JUR. 2D LANDLORD & TENANT § 20; see also Rachael Ann Neal Harrington, Vacation Rentals:
Commercial Activity Butting Heads with CC&Rs, 51 CAL. W.L. REV. 187, 193–97 (2015).
21
See infra notes 33–41 and accompanying text.
22
The definition of “residential,” as will become clear, is uncertain. See Part III.B., infra.
23
See Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. App. 1997).
24
See Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, 70 P.3d 664, 666 (Idaho 2003).
25
See O’Connor v. Resort Custom Builders, Inc., 591 N.W.2d 216, 217 (Mich. 1999) (where week-long
occupancy rights were sold for forty-eight weeks out of the year).
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any number of days in exchange for a small fee.26 Guests also enjoy cheaper
rates than hotels in many instances, even if they are renting an entire apartment.27
As a result, these sites have seen enormous success and have seized a large
portion of the short-term rental, and even hotel, market.28 In Los Angeles,
residents listed 11,401 units in 2014 on Airbnb alone, in which 135,000 of the
city’s 45 million tourists stayed, generating $314 million in economic activity.29
In New York City, Airbnb accounted for more than 51,000 listings in 2015.30
Aside from the advantages for hosts and lodgers, home-sharing activity can
have positive impacts on cities. An Airbnb study conducted in Los Angeles in
2014 cited environmental benefits, economic stimulation within neighborhoods
due to the spread of lodging, and social and cultural virtues for guests and
hosts.31 Similar effects have been observed in New York City.32
Yet there is increasing evidence that the rise in short-term rentals is creating
problems. Residents of Silver Lake, a neighborhood in Los Angeles, petitioned
their neighborhood council in 2014 to ban all short-term rentals after complaints
of traffic, safety issues, and transients.33 In New Orleans, residents have
implored their city to beef up short-term-rental regulation, citing “floors covered
with vomit,” “short-term strangers squeezing out long-term residents,” and

26
Airbnb, for example, takes 3% of the amount the host receives from their guest. What Is the Airbnb
Service Fee?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1857/what-is-the-airbnb-service-fee?topic=250
(last visited Feb. 20, 2019). These sites also typically charge a fee to guests, calculated as a percentage of the
host’s rental price and fees. E.g., id. (0%–20% of the reservation subtotal pre-tax).
27
Airbnb vs Hotels: A Price Comparison, PRICEONOMICS (June 17, 2013), https://priceonomics.com/
hotels (comparing median hotel and Airbnb prices in major cities and noting it is 21.2% cheaper to rent an entire
apartment on Airbnb and 49.5% cheaper to rent a single room on Airbnb).
28
For example, since it was founded in 2008, Airbnb has raised more than $3 billion and was recently
valued at $30 billion—making it the second most valuable private company in the United States. Katie Benner,
Airbnb Raises $1 Billion More in a Funding Round, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
03/09/technology/airbnb-1-billion-funding.html. The “vacation rental and alternative lodging market” on the
whole is at least $100 billion worldwide. See Dennis Schaal, How the Vacation Rental Land Grab Stacks Up:
HomeAway vs. Priceline vs. Airbnb, SKIFT (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://skift.com/2015/04/07/how-thevacation-rental-land-grab-stacks-up-homeaway-vs-priceline-vs-airbnb/.
29
See Lee, supra note 17, at 233.
30
Katie Benner, A Brooklyn Neighborhood Where Airbnb Is Being Put to the Test, N.Y. TIMES (July 3,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/technology/a-brooklyn-neighborhood-where-airbnb-is-being-putto-the-test.html?_r=0.
31
David Owen, Positive Impacts of Home Sharing in Los Angeles, AIRBNB PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 4,
2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/positive-impacts-home-sharing-los-angeles/ [https://perma.cc/B4W3LCTL].
32
See Benner, supra note 30 (detailing some of the positive and negative implications of increased homesharing activity).
33
The ban was not instated. See Tristan P. Espinosa, Comment, The Cost of Sharing and the Common
Law: How to Address the Negative Externalities of Home-Sharing, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 597, 601–03 (2016).
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concerns about condominium buildings that have become “rogue hotels.”34 A
group of New Orleanians has formed a grassroots “Short-Term Rental
Committee” to voice their grievances to the city.35 Similar attitudes toward
short-term rentals can be found in communities all over the country.36
Short-term rentals can also have crippling effects on a city-wide scale.
Increased rents, reduction in the aggregate supply of housing, increased
affordable housing shortages, gentrification, and a rise in racial and
socioeconomic disparity have all been linked to the increased “hotelization” of
housing units in Los Angeles to varying degrees.37 This “hotelization” does not
refer to owners who list their properties part-time when they are out of town but
otherwise live there—a large number of Los Angeles Airbnb properties “operate
year-round essentially as independent, unlicensed hotel rooms.”38 Moreover, a
growing number of listings are maintained by hosts who operate two or more
listings (and as many as seventy-eight).39 These city-wide effects are not isolated
to one particular location or region: A study of rentals in New York City found
substantially similar results,40 and the Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office
34
See Rob Walker, Airbnb Pits Neighbor Against Neighbor in Tourist-Friendly New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/business/airbnb-pits-neighbor-against-neighbor-intourist-friendly-new-orleans.html?_r=0.
35
See id. A rival group that supports short-term rentals in New Orleans is named “Alliance for
Neighborhood Prosperity.” Id.
36
See, e.g., Policy Analysis Report from Fred Brousseau, Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office, to
Supervisor Campos, City and County of S.F. Bd. of Supervisors, on Analysis of the Impact of Short-Term
Rentals on Housing 11 (May 13, 2015) [hereinafter Policy Analysis Report from Fred Brousseau] (“The
Planning Department has received noise complaints, concerns about parking, and other quality of life complaints
from residents due to units suspected to be short-term rentals. These impacts seem plausible, but the extent and
magnitude of these impacts have not been measured.”).
37
Lee, supra note 17, at 229–44. In the Venice neighborhood, 12.5% of all apartments are listed on
Airbnb. Id. at 237.
38
Id. at 234. (citing ROY SAMAAN, LAANE, AIRBNB, RISING RENT, AND THE HOUSING CRISIS IN LOS
ANGELES (2015), http://www.laane.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AirBnB-Final.pdf); see also AM. HOTEL &
LODGING ASS’N, FROM AIR MATTRESSES TO UNREGULATED BUSINESSES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE OTHER SIDE OF
AIRBNB (2016), https://www.ahla.com/sites/default/files/Airbnb_Analysis_September_2016_0.pdf (in Los
Angeles area, 4.36% of Airbnb operators list full-time (360 days or more), accounting for 30% of total Airbnb
revenue).
39
See AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N, supra note 38 (10%–30% of hosts in fourteen major U.S. cities are
multi-unit hosts); Adrian Glick Kudler, Meet LA’s Most Prolific Airbnb Host, with 78 Units for Rent, CURBED
LA (Mar. 12, 2015, 3:59 PM), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2015/03/airbnb_los_angeles_most_prolific_
host_ghc.php [http://perma.cc/4WMD-7MXH] (host with seventy-eight listings was a “full service vacation
rental management company” named Global Homes and Condos); see also SAMAAN, supra note 38, at 10.
40
See BJH ADVISORS LLC, SHORT CHANGING NEW YORK CITY: THE IMPACT OF AIRBNB ON NEW YORK
CITY’S HOUSING MARKET (June 2016), http://www.hcc-nyc.org/documents/ShortchangingNYC2016FINAL
protected_000.pdf (using “conservative” classification methods; finding high concentrations of Airbnb listings
in certain neighborhoods, decreased vacancy rates leading to higher rents, and significant activity by
“commercial hosts” that control as many as 272 listings).
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in San Francisco found that “[s]hort-term rentals may exacerbate the housing
shortage in San Francisco,” among other negative impacts.41
II. COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITIES
Common-interest communities acutely bear the burden of short-term rentals.
Before Part III explores the specific problems that common-interest
communities face when regulating short-term rentals, this Part provides the basic
foundation for understanding how a common-interest community works. These
communities are quasi-governmental in their function and the services they
provide, but instead of a constitution, statutes, and a legislative body, they are
usually governed by a collection of private-law analogues: a declaration, rules
and bylaws, and a community association.
A. The Common-Interest Community
A “common-interest” community is one where its residents are obligated to
pay dues to fund common services or facilities that benefit all residents.42 A
more complete definition may be found in the Restatement of Property:
A “common-interest community” is a real-estate development or
neighborhood in which individually owned lots or units are burdened
by a servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot be avoided by
nonuse or withdrawal
(1) to pay for the use of, or contribute to the maintenance of,
property held or enjoyed in common by the individual owners,
or
(2) to pay dues or assessments to an association that provides
services or facilities to the common property or to the
individually owned property, or that enforces other servitudes
burdening the property in the development or neighborhood.43

41

See Policy Analysis Report from Fred Brousseau, supra note 36, at 10–11.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
43
Id. A substantially similar definition appears in the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
(UCIOA). See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(9) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). The
principles of the Restatement and the UCIOA have been codified by several states, with some modifications. See
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS HANDBOOK 17-4 & n.4 (Mark A. Senn ed., 4th ed. 2018)
(“[S]tatutes grounded in UCIOA or the other uniform acts on which it is based are the law in 23 states.”); WAYNE
S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 1.01
(3d ed. 2000) (“We do not have a ‘national law’ of community associations, although the widespread acceptance
of the Uniform Laws approach and of the new Restatement of Servitudes has somewhat changed that situation.”).
They are sufficiently representative of the law of common-interest communities for the purposes of this
Comment, but there may be significant variety among jurisdictions in other areas.
42
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Though some states have enacted separate statutes for different forms of
common-interest communities—usually the trio of planned communities,
cooperatives, and condominiums, with a separate condominium statute being the
most common—this Comment uses the unified approach of the Restatement of
Property and the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) for
simplicity’s sake.44 This inclusive definition requires only a single servitude that
encumbers all property within the community requiring owners to pay for
common property, facilities, or services that are enjoyed by every owner.45 Of
course, common-interest communities may, and almost always do, include other
servitudes that place various restrictions on owners.46
A servitude is “a legal device that creates a right or an obligation that runs
with land or an interest in land.”47 In every case, a servitude will burden one
property and benefit another property.48 In particular, the servitudes in a
common-interest community usually involve reciprocal burdens and benefits:
Owners pay assessments and sacrifice some freedoms in exchange for amenities
shared by every community member.49 Additionally, a servitude will “run with
land”—meaning that it will automatically pass to successors in interest
regardless of notice or consent until the servitude is terminated.50 Servitudes are
presumed valid unless they violate state or federal law, the state constitution,51
or the state’s public policy (which usually allows for broad restrictions on land
use and enjoyment).52 Examples of servitudes that may violate public policy are
44
See 1994 PREFATORY NOTE, UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014)
(“[S]ome differences in result [among the separate uniform acts for each common-interest ownership type] were
of form rather than legitimate substance.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8 cmt. c
(condominium developments and cooperatives are common-interest communities under the Restatement).
45
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8.
46
See id. (“other servitudes burdening the property in the development or neighborhood”); French, supra
note 11, at 364 (community associations “typically restrict land use and regulate behavior within the
community”).
47
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1. This encompasses easements, profits, and
covenants (with a handful of exceptions) and thus includes equitable servitudes, negative easements, and
irrevocable licenses. See id. § 1.1 cmt. d.
48
See id. § 1.1 cmt. c.
49
See French, supra note 11, at 359–61.
50
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1 cmt. a; see also 31 C.J.S. Estates § 239 (2018).
51
Common-interest communities rarely interact with the U.S. Constitution because they rarely involve a
“state actor,” but they are frequently subject to state constitutions. See WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND
HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 4.02(a)–(b) (3d ed. 2000).
52
See Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(“[R]estrictions are clothed with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each
individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed. Such
restrictions . . . will not be invalidated absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in
violation of public policy, or that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1; id. at § 3.1 cmt. a (“This section applies the modern principle of freedom of contract
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those that are “arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious”; that “unreasonably burden[] a
fundamental constitutional right”; that indirectly or directly impose an
“unreasonable restraint on alienation”; that “impose[] an unreasonable restraint
on trade or competition”; or that are unconscionable.53
B. The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions
Servitudes that govern common-interest communities are contained in a
document called the “declaration,”54 which is usually recorded before any lot or
unit is sold, and which is often required by statute for creating a common-interest
community.55 “When the first lot or unit is sold subject to those servitudes, they
become effective as to all the property described in the declaration.”56 In
addition to servitudes, the declaration may also be required to contain other
provisions, depending on the jurisdiction.57 Often the declaration will contain
“the plan of development and the essentials of ownership, the method of
operation, and the rights and responsibilities of the association and the owners
within the association.”58
Because the declaration is a key foundational document for a commoninterest community, it has been characterized as the community’s
“constitution.”59 Covenants set forth in the declaration are generally afforded

to creation of servitudes.”); French, supra note 11, at 364 (compared to cities and private corporations,
community associations have more power to enact invasive restrictions, rules, and regulations that affect the
quality of residents’ lives).
53
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1; see id. §§ 3.4–3.7 (addressing direct restraints on
alienation, indirect restraints on alienation, restraints on trade or competition, and unconscionable servitudes);
see also UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-103 cmt. 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
54
This document may also be called the “declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions,” e.g.,
Estates at Desert Ridge Trails Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Vazquez, 300 P.3d 736, 738 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013),
“declaration of restrictions,” e.g., La Cebadilla Estates Corp. v. Sisneros, No. 2 CA-CV 2007-0087, 2007 WL
5615085, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2007), “declaration of covenants, deeds, and plats,” e.g., Armstrong v.
Ledges Homeowners Ass’n, 633 S.E.2d 78, 88 (N.C. 2006), or something else, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. e.
55
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4250(a) (West 2014) (“The declaration shall . . . set forth . . . the restrictions
on the use or enjoyment of any portion of the common interest development that are intended to be enforceable
equitable servitudes.”); UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-101(a) (“A common interest community
may be created pursuant to this [act] only by recording a declaration . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. e; HYATT, supra note 51, §§ 1.06(e), 2.02.
56
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. e.
57
See, e.g., UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-105.
58
HYATT, supra note 51, § 1.06(e).
59
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.10 cmt. a; HYATT, supra note 51, § 2.02; cf.
UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-117 cmt. 1 (declaration is “the perpetual governing instrument
for the common interest community”).
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judicial deference and a strong presumption of validity.60 Judicial interpretation
of covenants contained in a declaration proceeds using principles of contract and
constitutional interpretation, and courts will look to the intent of the parties, the
language of the instrument, and various rules comparable to constitutional
canons of construction to discern their meaning.61
Similar to a government’s constitution, the declaration is usually difficult to
amend. Statutes will often specify a default rule for amendment procedures, such
as a majority or two-thirds of owners with voting power, which may be varied
by the declaration in some circumstances.62 For amendments that enact more
fundamental changes, statutes may require a higher proportion of owner
approval; in such situations, decreasing the proportion required for amendment
may be prohibited.63 This staggered approach to declaration amendment reflects
60
See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Cal. 1994) (quoting Note,
Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 647 (1981) (“[G]iving deference to use
restrictions contained in a condominium project's originating documents protects the general expectations of
condominium owners ‘that restrictions in place at the time they purchase their units will be enforceable.’”));
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“[R]estrictions are
clothed with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each individual unit owner
purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed. Such restrictions . . . will not be
invalidated absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of public policy, or
that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.”); see also 31 C.J.S. Estates § 239 (2018). This
conforms with the Restatement’s treatment of servitudes in general. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 3.1.
61
Though courts generally agree that they should give effect to the intent of the parties to a restrictive
covenant, some jurisdictions have abandoned the traditional rule that ambiguous covenants should be construed
to favor the free and clear use of property, finding it too restrictive. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 4.1 (interpreting servitudes to effect intent of the parties according to language and surrounding
circumstances; preferring interpretations that do not violate public policy), and Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d
373, 376–77 (Ariz. 2006) (adopting the Restatement approach), with Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, 70 P.3d
664, 667 (Idaho 2003) (generally applying rules of contract construction and stating “all doubts are to be resolved
in favor of the free use of land”), and Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. App. 1997) (noting that the
“primary task is to determine the intent of the framers of the restrictive covenant”; liberally construing language;
finding that the covenant is strictly enforced against party seeking to enforce; favoring “free and unrestricted use
of the premises”).
62
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4270(b) (West 2017) (“If the declaration does not specify the percentage
of members who must approve an amendment of the declaration, an amendment may be approved by a majority
of all members . . . .”); UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-117 (amendments may be made by at
least 67% of votes, with exceptions; the declaration may vary the proportion for certain types of amendments);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.10 (majority of voting members may make certain
amendments; two-thirds of members may make other amendments with exceptions; these proportions may be
changed by the declaration). Before 2008, the UCIOA did not permit communities to decrease the proportion of
votes required for any amendment below 67%. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-117 cmt. 1.
63
See, e.g., UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-117(f) (at least 80% of votes required to
“prohibit or materially restrict the permitted uses of or behavior in a unit or the number or other qualifications
of persons who may occupy units”; this proportion may only be increased); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 6.10(3) (absent express provision in the declaration, unanimous approval required to “prohibit or
materially restrict the use or occupancy of, or behavior within, individually owned lots or units” or “change the
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a desire to allow the community to adapt and change over time while protecting
individual owners against unfair changes.64 In addition to protecting individual
members against abuse by the majority via voting requirements, the Restatement
recognizes “an implied power to amend the declaration to impose restrictions on
individually owned lots or units to prevent harm to and unreasonable
interference with the reasonable use of both common property and individually
owned property in the community.”65 Declaration amendments are usually
effective as to owners who purchase both before and after amendment,66 but this
is not true in every jurisdiction.67
C. The Community Association
In many instances, a common-interest community’s declaration will also
provide for the creation of a community association, although a formal
association is not required for every community in every circumstance.68 A
community association may generally be organized in any form, whether
incorporated or unincorporated.69 However, the association will almost always
be managed by a governing board,70 and common-interest community
governance is based on the corporate model.71 Every property owner within the
community will automatically be a member of the community association, and

basis for allocating voting rights or assessments”).
64
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.10 cmt. a. Additionally, the Restatement allows
a court to “excuse compliance” with certain provisions or amendment procedures, such as those requiring a
certain proportion of voters to approve an amendment. Id. § 6.12.
65
Id. § 6.10 cmt. d. Of course, these amendments must follow the prescribed procedures. See id. § 6.10.
66
See, e.g., Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 461 (Fla. 2002) (“[R]espondents
were on notice that the unique form of ownership they acquired when they purchased their units in the Woodside
Village Condominium was subject to change through the amendment process, and that they would be bound by
property adopted amendments.”); McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain Manor Ass’n, 386 S.E.2d 435, 436 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989); Worthinglen Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
67
See Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass’n, 310 N.W.2d 730, 734–35 (N.D. 1981) (North Dakota condominium
statute requires restrictions to be recorded in the declaration prior to conveyance; owner knowledge of
declaration provisions for amendment did not change their right to notice prior to purchase); see also 31 C.J.S.
Estates § 241 (2018) (“[A]n amendment cannot be applied retroactively to owners or to individuals who
purchased a unit prior to the amendment’s promulgation.”).
68
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.1 cmt. a; id. § 6.16 cmt. a. Some commoninterest community statutes do require that an association be created in all communities or in those of a certain
size. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 2014); UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-101;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.16 cmt. a. If the declaration does not establish an association,
the Restatement provides for other avenues to create one. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
§ 6.3. In the absence of an association, the members may exercise community powers by acting collectively. See
id. § 6.4.
69
See, e.g., UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-101.
70
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.16.
71
French, supra note 11, at 363; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.14 cmt. a.
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the distribution of voting power among members should be set forth in the
declaration, or else it will be equal by default.72 The association, usually
operating through its governing board, is tasked with managing common
property, enforcing servitudes, collecting fees and assessments, promulgating
bylaws and rules, and performing other functions set forth in the declaration.73
The association also has standing to sue on the behalf of itself or community
members.74 While carrying out their governing functions, the association and the
board owe fiduciary-like duties of care and good faith to community members.75
D. Bylaws and Rules
A community association has the power to promulgate bylaws and rules. In
keeping with the comparison of common-interest communities to private
governments, these additional governing documents are akin to the community’s
statutory scheme.76 Hence, because the declaration is the community’s
“constitution,” the declaration reigns supreme.77 Community association
bylaws, similar to those of a corporation, most often govern the internal
operations of the association and board, but they may also contain the same
material as rules.78 In general, bylaws are drafted at the creation of a commoninterest community and may be amended by the community association via
some vote greater than majority, but they may not be amended by a governing
board.79 In some jurisdictions, bylaws may contain the use restrictions that are
usually reserved for the declaration.80

72

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 6.3(1), 6.17; French, supra note 11, at 363.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.4; see also UNIF. COMMON INTEREST
OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-102(a); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 6.5–6.11. Some community
powers, especially amending the declaration, require community approval and cannot be performed by the board
alone. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 6.16 cmt. b. Bylaws and rules may also be recorded before any lot or unit is sold (and thus before
any association is created). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. e (“Sometimes the
bylaws or rules and regulations of a common-interest-community association are recorded before lots or units
are sold.”).
74
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.11.
75
See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103(a); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES §§ 6.13(1)(a), 6.14.
76
Carl B. Kress, Comment, Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a Property
Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 837, 841 (1995) (citing HYATT, supra note 51, § 7.02).
77
See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-103(c) (“If a conflict exists between the declaration
and the bylaws, the declaration prevails . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2
cmt. e (“[G]reater weight is often given the terms of the declaration than the terms of other governing documents
that are not recorded.”).
78
See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-106; HYATT, supra note 51, § 1.06(e).
79
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 703.10(5) (West 2018).
80
See, e.g., id. § 703.10(3) (“The bylaws also may contain any other provision regarding the management
73
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Rules, on the other hand, are similar to the rules and regulations of a
government administrative agency. They are most often promulgated by the
community association’s governing board to implement provisions of the
community’s declaration.81 They may not conflict with the declaration, bylaws,
or articles of incorporation or association of the community association, if
applicable.82 Rules often contain substantive regulations. Under the
Restatement, rules may address uses of and affecting common property,
“nuisance-like activities,” leasing (to meet underwriting requirements of
institutional lenders), and use or behavior restrictions that are expressly
authorized by statute or the declaration.83 Similarly, the UCIOA permits an
association to adopt rules affecting use or behavior of individual owners to
“implement a provision of the declaration,” “regulate any behavior in or
occupancy of a unit which violates the declaration or adversely affects the use
and enjoyment of other units or the common elements by other unit owners,” or
restrict leasing “to meet underwriting requirements of institutional lenders.”84
Rules are further limited by a reasonableness requirement in many
jurisdictions.85 However, community associations have at times been granted
broad rulemaking power that allows them to enact use restrictions not found in
the declaration without resident approval.86

and operation of the condominium, including any restriction on or requirement respecting the use and
maintenance of the units and the common elements.”).
81
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4340–70 (West 2014).
82
See, e.g., id. § 4350(c).
83
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.7 & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000). “[A]n
association’s power to make rules restricting use of individually owned property is based in the traditional
expectations of property owners that they are free to use their property for uses that are not prohibited and do
not unreasonably interfere with the neighbors’ use and enjoyment of their property.” Id. § 6.7 cmt. b; see also
Meadow Bridge Condo. Ass’n v. Bosca, 466 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (“[A] rule or regulation is
a tool to implement or manage existing structural law, while an amendment presumptively changes existing
structural law.” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979))).
84
See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-120(f) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
85
See id. § 3-120(h); see also Watts v. Oak Shores Cmty. Ass’n, 235 Cal. App. 4th 466, 468 (Cal. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, No. S226288, 2015 Cal. LEXIS 5134 (July 22, 2015) (“[H]omeowners associations may
adopt reasonable rules . . . .”); Worthinglen Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he validity of condominium rules is measured by whether the rule is reasonable under the
surrounding circumstances.”). On the other hand, New York applies the “business judgment rule” to evaluate
community association decisions. See Kress, supra note 76, at 863–69. In California, at least one court has
upheld broad rulemaking authority on grounds similar to the business judgment rule, though applying the
reasonableness standard. See Watts, 235 Cal. App. 4th at 473 (noting broad rulemaking authority and no express
prohibition on rules governing short-term rentals).
86
See generally Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, supra note 60, at 667 (arguing for
increased judicial review of condominium association rulemaking power). This may be the case in Watts. 235
Cal. App. 4th at 473–74 (applying judicial deference to all reasoned decision-making of community association
board, given broad grant of power and lack of specific limits).
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III. COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITY REGULATION OF SHORT-TERM
RENTALS: MEANS AND IMPEDIMENTS
The common-interest community framework described in Part II gives
communities tools with which to regulate short-term rentals. A new community
that is designed from its creation to limit short-term rentals, or eliminate them
entirely, should have little problem doing so. The main concern will be to draft
a clear and comprehensive policy and include it in the declaration. Problems
arise for existing common-interest communities that did not address short-termrental possibilities in their declaration. Considering the amount of recent
litigation on this issue, it is clear that a large number of communities did not—
but they can hardly be blamed for failing to predict the influence that platforms
such as Airbnb and VRBO have had on short-term rentals.
Recourse for common-interest communities in this situation is limited: The
declaration amendment process is difficult, and regulation on property use is not
the province of bylaws or rules.87 An alternative that many communities have
pursued is the residential use covenant that exists in some form in a great many
common-interest communities. This tack has been largely unsuccessful because
of the difficulty of defining the parameters of “residential use” and what activity
falls within these parameters.
Courts should hold that short-term rentals can create an unambiguous
commercial use that violates a residential use covenant. Some rental properties
are businesses, not residences, according to the common definitions of those
words. A logical definition of “residential use” will not permit the de facto hotels
that are being created using short-term rentals.88 However, this is not a foregone
conclusion, and many state courts have disagreed. A much better option,
therefore, is to introduce a clear restriction into the governing documents than
rely on a residential use covenant, if feasible.
A. Regulation of Short-Term Rentals: Best Practices
The best method to control short-term rentals is to include a clearly written
servitude in the community’s declaration. The declaration is the appropriate
location for restrictions on use and occupancy, and a covenant located in the
declaration will be found valid in most circumstances.89 Specifically, a servitude
restricting or prohibiting the rental of property entirely has been held not to be
87
88
89

See Part II, supra.
See Part I, supra.
See Section II.B, supra.
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an unreasonable restraint on alienation—or perhaps not even a restraint on
alienation at all, but rather a use restriction.90 It is also appropriate to amend the
declaration to enact retroactive limitations or prohibitions on short-term
rentals.91 In many jurisdictions, these amendments will be applicable to both
prior and subsequent purchasers.92 Generally, bylaws and rules are not the
appropriate places to enact new restrictions on property use, but this is not true
in all jurisdictions.93
An effective servitude limiting short-term rentals should precisely define
“short-term rental” and specify exactly how many days a property may be rented
out. Or, the servitude could restrict short-term rentals to a specific number of
times per year or month, or to a certain number of units within a community at
a time. A common-interest community has substantial freedom in the use
restrictions that may be imposed,94 as illustrated by the following particularly
strict covenant: “No residential unit owner shall rent, lease or otherwise so
demise any residential unit or any part therein. Owners shall not permit the use
of said unit by any party other than owner or owner’s immediate family
member.”95 Although designed to prohibit all rental, lease, or similar activity, a
subsequent clause in the same declaration is clearer, referring to “a rental
agreement, lease, or other instrument granting occupancy.”96 This pair of
covenants helps to illustrate two points. First, the lack of consistency creates a
concern that the lease and rental restriction will be interpreted to refer to
different activity than the grandfather clause. Second, the subtle differences in
each phrase calls attention to the need for precision when drafting CC&Rs. The
latter is especially important in the context of short-term rentals because of all
the variables involved, including the distinction between a lease and a short-term

90
See Breezy Point Holiday Harbor Lodge—Beachside Apt. Owners’ Ass’n v. B.P. P’ship, 531 N.W.2d
917, 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Holiday Out in Am. at St. Lucie, Inc. v. Bowes, 285 So. 2d 63, 64–65
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)) (holding that a rental limitation is not a restraint on alienation at all, and even if it
were, it would not be unreasonable); Apple Valley Gardens Ass’n, Inc. v. MacHutta, 763 N.W.2d 126, 133 (Wis.
2009) (holding that a rental restriction did not render title to condominium unmarketable because it did not affect
owner’s ability to convey); Le Febvre v. Osterndorf, 275 N.W.2d 154, 158 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979); see also 15B
AM. JUR. 2D CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS § 39 (West 2018).
91
See HYATT, supra note 51, § 9.06.
92
See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
93
See Sections II.C.–D., supra.
94
See Sections II.A.–B., supra.
95
Apple Valley Gardens, 763 N.W.2d at 128–29 (quoting a common-interest community declaration
amendment).
96
Id. at 129.
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rental.97 Thus, for example, a covenant restricting “leases” should not apply to
short-term rentals.98
B. Residential Use Covenants
In many cases, the declaration does not explicitly address short-term rentals
and any attempts to amend the declaration fail; in this circumstance,
communities are left to use other means to attempt to corral owners whom they
believe are breaking the rules and being disruptive. One servitude that has been
litigated extensively is a “residential use” covenant, a common clause that many
community associations and residents have claimed prohibits at least some kinds
of short-term-rental activity.99
Some courts have held that mandating residential use is less restrictive than
prohibiting business or commercial use, while many others have held that
“residential use” precludes “business” or “commercial” use by definition.100 At
least one court has suggested that a prohibition on “commercial or industrial
ventures or business of any type” for “residential lots” is not synonymous with
requiring residential use—although the court did not elaborate on the
distinction.101 This Comment assumes that residential use implicitly forbids
commercial or business use, which conforms to the analysis of many courts and
does not require the confusing task of distinguishing between “residential use,”
“residential, noncommercial use,” “no commercial use,” and any number of
other combinations.

97

See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
See id.
99
See, e.g., Santa Monica Beach Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Acord, 219 So. 3d 111, 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2017) (citing a number of jurisdictions that have considered and rejected this contention); Hyatt v. Court, No.
2008-CA-001474-MR, 2009 WL 2633659, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2009) (holding that a frequently rented
vacation property was a non-residential, business use); O’Connor v. Resort Custom Builders, Inc., 591 N.W.2d
216, 221 (Mich. 1999) (holding that interval ownership split up into forty-eight weeks “did not constitute a
residential purpose”); Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 816–17 (Tex. App. 1997) (granting a temporary
injunction on short-term rentals based on a residential use restriction). A clause limiting property to “residential
use” or “residential purposes” is sometimes replaced with or complemented by a prohibition on “business use”
or “commercial use.” See, e.g., Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 815 (“All tracts . . . shall be used solely for residential,
camping or picnicking purposes and shall never be used for business purposes.”).
100
Compare O’Connor, 591 N.W.2d at 218 (citing Beverly Island Ass’n v. Zinger, 317 N.W.2d 611, 613
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982)) (“A restriction allowing residential uses permits a wider variety of uses than a restriction
prohibiting commercial or business use.”), with Estates at Desert Ridge Trails Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Vazquez,
300 P.3d 736, 741 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (“Courts . . . read into [‘residential use’ or ‘residential purposes’
language] a prohibition on activities associated with a commercial or business purpose, regardless of whether
the covenants at issue include such an express prohibition.”).
101
See Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, 70 P.3d 664, 668 (Idaho 2003).
98
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Regardless, a residential use covenant is a poor method by which to target
any specific activity that a common-interest community desires to limit because
it is inherently imprecise. Some activities may be consistent with both
commercial and residential use, making it difficult to identify violations.102
Additionally, “residential use” itself is subject to at least two reasonable
interpretations: “a ‘residence’ can refer simply to a building used as a dwelling
place, or it can refer to a place where one intends to live for a long time.”103
Consequently, state courts have interpreted “residential use” in significantly
different ways, and many of them have been reluctant to find an implicit
restriction on short-term rentals. And even if a court agrees that some short-termrental activity is incompatible with residential use, there is no guarantee that
their interpretation will satisfy the common-interest community. For instance, it
appears that no court has concluded that a residential use covenant precludes all
short-term-rental activity. The only way to ensure that the common-interest
community’s particular needs are met is to address short-term rentals in the
governing documents.
C. Differing Interpretations of Residential Use Among State Courts
Courts in a large number of jurisdictions that have had occasion to address
the issue have held that residential use covenants do not restrict any short-term
rentals.104 Under this view, homeowners are free to engage in short-term rentals
notwithstanding a requirement of residential use. Some of these jurisdictions
recognize the traditional rule that ambiguous restrictive covenants are strictly
interpreted to favor the free and unrestricted use of property.105 Another
presumption that often accompanies the foregoing is that “[r]estrictive covenants
are construed strictly against those claiming the right to enforce them.”106 Thus,
if a court finds that a residential use covenant is subject to more than one
102
HYATT, supra note 51, § 3.04 (“Business use is a difficult topic because so many different activities
can violate the restriction yet be consistent with a residential use as well.”).
103
Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Or. 1997).
104
See, e.g., Santa Monica Beach, 219 So. 3d at 114 (citing a number of jurisdictions that have so held);
cf. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103 cmt. 22 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (“[O]wners of
residential units . . . may hold those units for investment purposes, or . . . individual owners may occasionally or
regularly rent their units on an individual or rental pool basis.”).
105
See Santa Monica Beach, 219 So. 3d at 116 (quoting Leamer v. White, 156 So. 3d 567, 572 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2015)); see also, e.g., Pinehaven Planning Bd., 70 P.3d at 668; O’Connor, 591 N.W.2d at 219; Estates
at Desert Ridge Trails, 300 P.3d at 743 (quoting Cain v. Powers, 668 P.2d 300, 302 (N.M. 1983)); Munson v.
Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. App. 1997); 1 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITIONS
§ 61.04(b)(1)(i) (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2018). But see, e.g., Hyatt v. Court, No. 2008-CA-001474-MR,
2009 WL 2633659, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2009) (noting that Kentucky has abolished the old rule of strict
construction).
106
O’Connor, 591 N.W.2d at 218; see also, e.g., Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 816.
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reasonable interpretation, it will be held not to interfere with short-term
rentals.107
Other courts have found that residential use covenants unambiguously do not
prohibit short-term rentals, a conclusion which often involves a broad
interpretation of “residential.”108 The recurring logic in these opinions states that
as long as the renter—the person occupying the property—uses the property for
residential purposes, there can be no violation.109 As the Florida appellate court
recently held, “the critical issue is whether the renters are using the property for
ordinary living purposes such as sleeping and eating, not the duration of the
rental.”110 “[E]ven if the properties are rented to different persons every night,”
according to this reasoning, short-term rentals can never be a commercial use.111
Similarly, according to the Washington appellate court, a short-term renter’s use
of a rented property is “identical to [the homeowner’s] own use of the property,
as a residence, or the use made by a long-term tenant.”112 In other words, if the
person occupying a living space uses it as though it were their residence, then
the use is always residential.113
Nevertheless, a few courts have found short-term rentals or similar activity
to violate residential use covenants.114 Some of these courts have defined
107
See, e.g., Pinehaven Planning Bd., 70 P.3d at 668 (“Even if this Court determined the Covenants at
issue were ambiguous, because they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, they would still be
construed in favor of the free use of land, as a matter of law.”).
108
Their definition resembles the first option presented in Yogman: “a building used as a dwelling place.”
937 P.2d at 1021.
109
See Santa Monica Beach, 219 So. 3d at 115–16; Pinehaven Planning Bd., 70 P.3d at 668 (“[R]enting
this dwelling to people who use it for the purposes of eating, sleeping, and other residential purposes does not
violate the prohibition on commercial and business activity as such terms are commonly understood.”); Gadd v.
Hensley, Nos. 2015-CA-001948-MR, 2016-CA-000164-MR, 2017 WL 1102982, at *6 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 7,
2017) (“The rental of one’s home does not transform it from a single-family residence since a vacation renter
uses a home for the purposes of eating, sleeping, and other residential purposes.”); Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys.
Ass’n, 327 P.3d 614, 620 (Wash. 2014) (“If a vacation renter uses a home for the purposes of eating, sleeping,
and other residential purposes, this use is residential, not commercial, no matter how short the rental duration.”).
110
Santa Monica Beach, 219 So. 3d at 114.
111
Id. at 115–16.
112
Ross v. Bennett, 203 P.3d 383, 388 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that short-term rentals did not
violate a residential purposes covenant).
113
Cf. Santa Monica Beach, 219 So. 3d at 114–16.
114
See, e.g., La Cebadilla Estates Corp. v. Sisneros, No. 2 CA-CV 2007-0087, 2007 WL 5615085, at *4
(Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2007); Hyatt v. Court, No. 2008-CA-001474-MR, 2009 WL 2633659 (Ky. Ct. App.
Aug. 28, 2009), modified, Gadd, 2017 WL 1102982 (Gadd, an unpublished opinion, declined to extend Hyatt
because it was unpublished as well); O’Connor v. Resort Custom Builders, Inc., 591 N.W.2d 216, 220–21 (Mich.
1999) (timesharing interval ownership); Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, 510 S.W.3d 725, 729–31 (Tex.
App. 2016); Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex. App. 1997); see also Robins v. Walter, 670 So. 2d
971, 973–74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (bed and breakfast with separate entrance and business-like
characteristics was commercial use; but the court found that this was not a “rental” as excepted in subdivision
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“residential use” or “residence” narrowly as referring to, for example, “both
physical presence and an intention to remain.”115 These opinions do not hold that
short-term rentals per se violate the covenant, but instead find that certain
features of the particular use indicate that it is not residential, but rather a
commercial venture—for example, the frequency of the activity, indicia of
business, and government business tax or license requirements.116 Some
property owners who rent their home out frequently, as one court opined, “have
gone to a great deal of trouble to treat their . . . property as a business,”117 and
the enterprise resembles traditional lodging establishments such as bed and
breakfasts, hotels, and motels. In addition to the tax and licensing requirements
that many states require,118 these properties may be advertised online and
provide the same services, commodities, and amenities that would be found in a
hotel.119 When a rental property is owned by a business entity, at least one court
has held that a business can never “reside” therein but can only conduct
business.120 The unifying proposition in these opinions is that whenever a
property is not being used as a permanent or long-term residence, but rather to
conduct a short-term-rental business, it is not consistent with a residential use
covenant.
D. A Narrow Definition of Residential Use Is Preferable
Neither interpretation of “residential use” is inherently unreasonable because
the term is ambiguous.121 However, the broad definition accepted by a plurality
of courts122 is inappropriate in the context of a residential common-interest
community comprising individual homes—be they condominiums, townhomes,
or single-family detached homes. The narrow definition that contemplates living
in a place for a long period also more accurately reflects common usage of the
term.

covenant); Pinehaven Planning Bd., 70 P.3d at 669 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
115
Tarr, 510 S.W.3d at 730 (quoting Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 816).
116
See, e.g., Tarr, 510 S.W.3d at 730–31.
117
Hyatt, 2009 WL 2633659, at *4.
118
See infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.
119
See, e.g., La Cebadilla Estates, 2007 WL 5615085, at *2 (“[A]dvertisements stated all linens, toiletries,
towels, and household items were provided, ‘[j]ust like a hotel would offer,’ and offered daily maid service, a
cook, and a chauffeur as amenities of the property.”); Hyatt, 2009 WL 2633659, at *1 (website, security deposit,
cleaning fee, pet fee, linens, toiletries, etc.); Tarr, 510 S.W.3d at 730–31 (owner set up an LLC, provided a
leasing agreement with check-in and check-out times and a cancellation policy).
120
La Cebadilla Estates, 2007 WL 5615085, at *4 (“Because [the owner] is a business, not an individual,
it is incapable of residing at the property; it can only conduct business there.”).
121
See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
122
See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
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In common parlance and according to some legal definitions, a person’s
“residence” refers to the location where a person actually lives for an extended
period.123 A short-term rental, by contrast, is transient: It gives a paying occupant
a temporary place to stay.124 Thus a person staying in a hotel or an Airbnb rental
for a week, or even a month, could not reasonably declare that they were
“residing” therein.125 A broad definition of “residential” focusing on using a
space for “living purposes”126 would encompass hotels and other transient
lodging establishments, and indeed this was the position taken by the Uniform
Building Code.127 Yet it would be inapposite to allow a hotel or bed and
breakfast into a residential community,128 and the same goes for a de facto hotel
being operated via short-term rentals. However, the precise point at which shortterm-rental activity ceases to be residential is difficult to determine.
In addition to “residential,” the term “use” is a component of a residential
use covenant, and thus it is important to understand what that refers to. Several
courts have said that the proper analysis is to look to the behavior of short-term
lodgers to determine whether a property is being used for residential purposes.129
Yet these opinions do not offer a compelling reason why the activity of a mere
licensee130 should determine the overall use of a property. Instead, it is more
123
The dictionary definition of “residence” may refer to “the act or fact of dwelling in a place for some
time” or “living or regularly staying at or in some place”; it may similarly refer to “the place where one actually
lives as distinguished from one’s domicile or a place of temporary sojourn.” Residence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/residence (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (emphasis added); see also
Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 816–17 (Tex. App. 1997) (“If a person comes to a place temporarily, without
any intention of making that place his or her home, that place is not considered the person’s residence.”). For a
legal description of “residence,” see, for example, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES § 201(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2017)
(“A natural person is resident in the State in which he or she is habitually found or maintains significant
professional or personal connections.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (AM. LAW INST.
1971) (“[An individual] is more likely to have [residence in] a state where he has a fixed dwelling place than in
one where he lives only in hotels or boarding houses.”).
124
Cf. Robins v. Walter, 670 So. 2d 971, 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a bed and breakfast
business violated a residential use covenant that defined “renting” as not commercial).
125
Cf. Residence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/residence (last
visited Feb. 20, 2019). These are “temporary places of sojourn.” Cf. id.
126
See Santa Monica Beach Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 219 So. 3d 111, 114–16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
127
See Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, 70 P.3d 664, 668 (Idaho 2003) (citing UNIFORM BUILDING
CODE 1-26 (INT’L CONF. BLDG. OFFICIALS 1997)) (Uniform Building Code expressly referenced by commoninterest community governing documents). The Uniform Building Code, promulgated by an organization based
in California, was one of the three major model building codes in the United States. See Jim Rossberg & Roberto
T. Leon, Evolution of Codes in the USA, NEHRP 4–5 (2013), https://www.nehrp.gov/pdf/UJNR_2013_
Rossberg_Manuscript.pdf. They were replaced by the International Building Code in 2000, and it quickly
became the national standard. See id. at 4–8.
128
See Robins, 670 So. 2d at 975.
129
See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
130
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
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appropriate to look to the party in possession of the property. Unlike an owner
in fee or a tenant, a licensee in a short-term-rental transaction does not gain legal
possession of the property they are renting.131 Instead, the property, though being
occupied by a short-term renter, is still subject to the management and control
of the possessor.132
Thus, a short-term renter, unlike a tenant or owner in fee, is not the user of
the property in any meaningful legal sense because they do not have any
appreciable amount of control over the property.133 They are subject to the
license and control of whomever is in possession of the property.134 Therefore,
the analysis of whether a use is residential or commercial should consider the
party in possession, which would in most cases be the homeowner or a tenant.
A similar tack, though not explicitly discussed in terms of possession, was taken
by the Kentucky appellate court in Hyatt v. Court.135
Generally, when short-term rentals are held to violate a residential use
covenant, it is because they are more accurately classified as a business or
commercial venture than a residence.136 Under the definition of residential use
endorsed by this Comment, commercial or business use by definition violates a
residential use covenant.137 There must be a point at which use of property ceases
to be residential and becomes commercial, and this turns on the distinction
between “activity” and “use.” The mere presence of commercial activity does
not necessarily create a commercial use.
“Activity” is satisfied by the barest departure from inaction.138 A “use”
suggests something far more permanent: “[A] long-continued possession and
employment of a thing for the purpose for which it is adapted, as distinguished
from a possession and employment that is merely temporary or
131

See 28 AM. JUR. 2D ESTATES § 3 (2d. ed. 2018); 49 AM. JUR. 2D LANDLORD & TENANT § 20 (2d ed.

2018).
132

See Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, 282 P.2d 890, 893 (Cal. 1955); cf. 49 AM. JUR. 2D LANDLORD & TENANT

§ 20.
133
“The chief distinction between a tenant and a lodger lies in the character of possession. A ‘tenant’ has
exclusive legal possession of premises and is responsible for their care and condition. A ‘lodger’ has only the
right to use the premises, subject to the landlord's retention of control and right of access to them. To make one
a tenant . . . he must have exclusive possession and control.” Stowe, 282 P.2d at 893. Of course, as this quote
suggests, a lodger does indeed “use” the property in some form, for they occupy the premises and make use of
its amenities—but they are not the user in the higher level context of residential use. See id.
134
See id.
135
No. 2008-CA-001474-MR, 2009 WL 2633659 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2009).
136
See supra note 114.
137
See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
138
See Activity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/activity (last visited
Feb. 20, 2019).
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occasional . . . .”139 Conducting commercial activity in the home does not create
a non-residential, commercial use of property until that activity becomes the
primary purpose of the property.140 “Commercial activity,” in short, is activity
“conducted to make a profit.”141 By contrast, “commercial use” refers to “an
ongoing profit-making activity,”142 such as a “business.”143
For example, if a man turns furniture legs on a lathe in his garage and sells
them to his neighbors, he is engaging in commercial activity for profit, but it
cannot be said that his home has ceased to be used for residential purposes. If
the man increases his production and begins selling hundreds of legs to Ace
Hardware, and if a line of large trucks parks outside his home twice a month to
collect orders, his home is beginning to look like a business. The neighbors may
very well think so. Yet the man continues to use three-quarters of his home as a
residence. Now, if the man moves out of his home and converts it into a small
furniture factory with three employees and a sign out front, then the home is
probably being used for commercial purposes, for its sole occupation is
commercial.
A similar analysis was undertaken by the dissenting opinion in the
Washington case of Metzner v. Wojdyla, which involved a woman who operated
a day care facility in a subdivision subject to a “residential purposes only”
covenant.144 Although Justice Guy did not fully explore the distinction between
commercial activity and use, his opinion recognized that not all commercial
activity violates a residential use covenant: “[T]he majority’s interpretation . . .
erroneously assumes that business uses are per se incompatible with residential
uses.”145 In his estimation, the intent behind a residential use covenant is “a
desire to preserve the residential character of the neighborhood and to make the

139

Use, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Cf. Houston v. Wilson Mesa Ranch Homeowners’ Ass’n, 360 P.3d 255, 260 (Colo. App. 2015)
(“[R]eceipt of income does not transform residential use of property into commercial use.”); O’Connor v. Resort
Custom Builders, Inc., 591 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Mich. 1999) (quoting Beverly Island Ass’n v. Zinger, 317 N.W.2d
611, 613 (Mich. 1982) (“A business use ‘may not violate a residential use covenant so long as the nonresidential
use was casual, infrequent or unobtrusive . . . .’”)); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Okla. 1985)
(“Although the commercial nature of a group may have some relevance, that characteristic is not determinative
in this case. It is the purpose and method of operation which serves to distinguish the proposed residential use
of the home from that normally incident to a purely commercial operation.”).
141
Commercial Activity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
142
Commercial Use, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
143
That is, “[a] commercial enterprise carried on for profit; a particular occupation or employment
habitually engaged in for livelihood or gain.” Business, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
144
886 P.2d 154, 158 (Wash. 1994) (Guy, J., dissenting).
145
Id. at 159.
140
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neighborhood more attractive for residential purposes.”146 Violation occurs
when business activity is so disruptive as to “alter the character of a
neighborhood.”147
The idea that residential use covenants exist to preserve the character of a
residential neighborhood is a reflection of the balance between the private rights
of the individual property owner and the collective rights of the community. As
Justice Taney wrote in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, “[w]hile the
rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget, that the
community also have [sic] rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every
citizen depends on their faithful preservation.”148 Although even the earliest
forms of common-interest communities had yet to emerge in the United
States,149 Taney’s words ring true today and should be a guiding principle behind
interpretation of residential use covenants.
An individual short-term-rental transaction is indeed commercial activity for
a number of reasons: (i) short-term rentals are a monetary transaction and fit
within the definition of commercial activity;150 (ii) they often require a business
permit or license;151 (iii) governments often classify them as commercial;152
(iv) they are often subject to the same transient occupancy taxes as hotels;153 and
146
147
148
149

Id.
Id.
36 U.S. 420, 548 (1837).
See HYATT, supra note 51, § 1.05(a) (tracing the history of common-interest communities in the United

States).
150

See Commercial Activity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See Lisa Mercer, Business Licensing Laws for Short-Term Vacation Rentals, USA TODAY, https://web.
archive.org/web/20160105155100/http://traveltips.usatoday.com/business-licensing-laws-shortterm-vacationrentals-101455.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2019); What Legal and Regulatory Issues Should I Consider Before
Hosting on Airbnb?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/376/what-legal-and-regulatory-issuesshould-i-consider-before-hosting-on-airbnb (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (“In many cities, you must register, get
a permit, or obtain a license before you list your property or accept guests.”).
152
See, e.g., SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 9.51.030 (2017), http://www.qcode.us/codes/
santamonica/ (“Vacation Rental” included in “Nonresidential Use Classifications”); Hotel Occupancy Taxes,
AUSTINTEXAS.GOV, http://austintexas.gov/department/hotel-occupancy-taxes (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (“[A
hotel] includes, without limitation, hotels, motels, tourist homes, vacation rentals by owner, houses or courts,
lodging houses, inns, hostels, rooming houses, bed and breakfasts, short-term vacation rentals or other buildings
where rooms are furnished for consideration.”).
153
See, e.g., Hyatt v. Court, No. 2008-CA-001474-MR, 2009 WL 2633659, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28,
2009) (“[T]he . . . Marshall County tourist and convention commission monthly transient room tax, and the
Kentucky sales use and transient room tax, . . . [are] required of motels, hotels, and persons renting their
property.”); Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n Inc., 510 S.W.3d 725, 727–28 (Tex. App. 2016) (“[The
owner] paid Texas Hotel Tax, which is applicable to all rentals of less than thirty days. [He] also remitted the
San Antonio/Bexar County Hotel/Motel Tax, which applies to rentals of less than 30 days.”); PLACER CTY.,
CAL., CODE ch. 4.16.010–030 (2017), http://qcode.us/codes/placercounty/; Hotel Occupancy Taxes, supra note
152; see also Emily Badger, Airbnb Is About to Start Collecting Hotel Taxes in More Major Cities, Including
151
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(v) the IRS requires real estate rental income to be separately reported either as
“supplemental” or “business income.”154
Short-term rentals are also more likely to “alter the character of a
neighborhood”155 and burden community associations than long-term rentals or
tenancies. As a California appellate court has noted,
That short-term renters cost [an] Association more than long-term
renters or permanent residents is not only supported by the evidence
but experience and common sense places the matter beyond debate.
Short-term renters use the common facilities more intensely; they take
more staff time in giving directions and information and enforcing the
rules; and they are less careful in using the common facilities because
they are not concerned with the long-term consequences of abuse.156

And, as discussed above, there are many concrete examples of the problems
short-term rentals are causing all over the country.157 Granting unrestricted
license to engage in commercial activity that has the potential to be so disruptive,
as many courts may have done, allows enterprising owners to undermine the
residential character of a neighborhood in a way that elevates the rights of the
individual far above those of the community. On the other hand, reading a
blanket ban on short-term rentals into the vagaries of residential use covenants
would go too far in the other direction. Because residential use covenants are
only clear insofar as they prohibit uses that are not residential, including
commercial or business uses, courts should only interfere and enjoin activity that
clearly crosses the line.
E. When Do Short-Term Rentals Become a Commercial Use?
There are many examples of short-term-rental activity that clearly does not
rise to the level of a business. Short-term rentals often allow people to share
their homes, rather than turn them into businesses, as a source of supplemental
income, especially in expensive cities where wages make it difficult to pay
rent.158 Though commercial activity occurs when lodgers pay to stay, it is either
Washington, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/29/airbnbis-about-to-start-collecting-hotel-taxes-in-more-major-cities-including-washington/.
154
The distinction turns on whether amenities such as maid service are provided to the renter. See 2018
Instructions for Schedule E (Form 1040), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1040se (last visited Feb. 20,
2019); 2018 Instructions for Schedule C, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1040sc (last visited Feb. 20,
2019).
155
Metzner v. Wojdyla, 886 P.2d 154, 159 (Wash. 1994) (Guy, J., dissenting).
156
Watts v. Oak Shores Cmty. Ass’n, 235 Cal. App. 4th 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
157
See Part II, supra.
158
See James A. Allen, Disrupting Affordable Housing: Regulating Airbnb and Other Short-Term Rental
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infrequent—for example, while the owner or tenant is on vacation—or
incidental to the residential use of the owner or tenant—for example, when a
lodger sleeps on the sofa for a night.159 In both cases, the person in possession
of the property is still using the property as their residence, or home, for they are
usually physically present and they intend to remain there in the future despite
the occasional presence of lodgers.160
Yet short-term rentals are not always used as an infrequent source of cash
for a homeowner or tenant who lives on their property. An increasing number of
rental properties are being operated as commercial ventures, and many of them
are owned by business entities rather than individuals.161 Less than half of
Airbnb listings in New York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco mirror the
traditional “home-sharing” model where the host is on-site during the lodger’s
stay, and only 3%–4% of listings are for “couch sharing.”162 “While it was
Airbnb’s intention to start as a means of bringing together a community and
offering a supplemental income, some units on Airbnb in New York have
morphed into full-fledged businesses.”163 For example, the City of New York
has filed suit against a short-term-rental syndicate that illegally rented out 130
apartments across Manhattan.164 The scheme, which produced nearly $21
million in revenue from 2015 to 2018, involved 18 corporations and “more than
100 Airbnb host accounts” opened using various names to disguise the
operation.165
A study that analyzed Airbnb listings in fourteen U.S. cities found that “[a]
growing number of hosts are using the Airbnb platform to operate full-time
businesses” and that this group accounts for 26% of the company’s revenue.166
Additionally, a growing number of hosts list their units for more than 180
days.167 “Multi-unit hosts” with two or more units account for nearly 40% of
Airbnb’s revenue, and this group often overlaps with full-time hosts.168 In the
Hosting in New York City, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L. 151, 174–75 (2017).
159
See id. at 167.
160
Cf. Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. App. 1997) (“[R]esidence generally requires both
physical presence and an intention to remain.”).
161
See, e.g., SAMAAN, supra note 38, at 10 (Los Angeles).
162
See id. at 8.
163
Allen, supra note 158, at 166.
164
Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Inside the Rise and Fall of a Multimillion-Dollar Airbnb Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/nyregion/airbnb-nyc-law.html.
165
Id.; Luis Ferré-Sadurní, New York Empire of Illegal Airbnb Rentals Booked 75,000 Guests, Suit Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019).
166
AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N, supra note 38 (“full-time” defined as at least 360 days per year).
167
Id.
168
Id.
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instances where a host does list a single property, they are far more likely to
receive no profit from the listing: “38 percent of [Airbnb] hosts with a single
listing of any type generated no income whatsoever.”169 On the other hand,
“commercial entities” own the most heavily used units in cities like Los Angeles,
and these units have occupancy rates that are nearly identical to those of
traditional hotels.170 So while Airbnb does, by percentage, primarily remain a
platform for hosts to infrequently rent out a single property, a disproportionate
share of the money goes to the growing number of multiple-unit and full- or
greater than half-time hosts.
In some cases, it is relatively easy to conclude that rental activity is of a great
enough frequency and intensity to cross the line between commercial activity
and commercial use: For example, a full-time rental property listed 360 or more
days out of the year and never occupied by an owner or tenant is being used to
make a profit nearly 100% of the time and is being used as a residence none of
the time.171 In other words, the possessor never conducts residential activity on
the property, but always commercial activity. The same is true when a business
entity, rather than an individual, is in possession of a property, because “a
business . . . is incapable of residing at [a] property; it can only conduct business
there.”172 There are other factors that are indicia of commercial use, including
the observation of the formalities of lodging business,173 providing amenities
common to lodging businesses,174 the payment of transient occupancy taxes,175

169

SAMAAN, supra note 38, at 13.
See id. at 10 (around 66% occupancy; one listing in Venice Beach had a 93% occupancy rate).
171
See Metzner v. Wojdyla, 886 P.2d 154, 159 (Wash. 1994) (Guy, J., dissenting) (“In exceptional
circumstances, the main use and purpose of the property is clearly business, i.e., the property is used for business
purposes 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.”); AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N, supra note 38 (data on full-time
short-term-rental properties).
172
La Cebadilla Estates Corp. v. Sisneros, No. 2 CA-CV 2007-0087, 2007 WL 5615085, at *4 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 2007). However, a business could lease a property to an individual to reside therein.
173
See, e.g., id. (“[T]he trial court could reasonably infer that other business was conducted there as well,
such as meeting with guests to obtain identification, have rental agreements signed, or provide keys to the
property.”); Hyatt v. Court, No. 2008-CA-001474-MR, 2009 WL 2633659, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2009)
(security deposit, cleaning fee, pet fee, sales tax, written rental agreement, check-in and check-out times, damage
deposit, and extra persons charge); Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, 510 S.W.3d 725, 730–31 (Tex.
App. 2016) (guest agreement designating check-in and check-out times, cancellation policy, and minimum stay
“show[ed] that the home [was] being used for transient purposes”).
174
See, e.g., La Cebadilla Estates, 2007 WL 5615085, at *7 (“[A]dvertisements stated all linens, toiletries,
towels, and household items were provided, ‘[j]ust like a hotel would offer,’ and offered daily maid service, a
cook, and a chauffeur as amenities of the property.”); Hyatt, 2009 WL 2633659, at *1 (“The [owners] provided
linens, paper products, and other amenities for which there were other fees.”).
175
See supra note 153.
170
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running advertisements,176 ownership or management by a business entity,177
and ownership of multiple properties.178 Courts should determine whether, under
the totality of the circumstances, the primary purpose of a property is to conduct
a short-term-rental business rather than be a residence.
F. Appropriate Resolution of Short-Term Rentals and Residential Use
Covenants
Interpreting residential use covenants to prohibit only short-term-rental
activity that clearly amounts to commercial use would not prevent every
negative externality of short-term rentals, but it would stop the most harmful and
hotel-like instances from infiltrating common-interest communities. It would be
unwise to leave the entire question of short-term-rental regulation in commoninterest communities up to the courts because the judiciary is not attuned to the
specific needs of each community. Moreover, common-interest community
disputes are particularly ill-suited for judicial resolution: “Resorting to the courts
to resolve disputes tends to be highly divisive and can create substantial
discontent within the community. . . . In addition, many disputes may never be
resolved, and, abuses by association boards may go unchecked because of the
emotional toll and financial risks involved in bringing a lawsuit.”179 If
disagreements cannot be resolved internally with improved communication
within the community, it may be preferable to circumvent the judicial branch
entirely and implement alternative dispute resolution or state bureaucratic
oversight to resolve conflict.180
Limited judicial review of the intersection between short-term rentals and
residential use would ease the greatest burdens faced by common-interest
communities that find it difficult to introduce rental restrictions into their
governing documents without giving community associations too much power
to blindside residents with unexpected restrictions on use. If, for example, the
rulemaking power of community associations were expanded to allow
associations to impose retroactive use restrictions, it would subvert the
expectations of owners, as a matter of both freedom of contract and free use of
176
See, e.g., Hyatt, 2009 WL 2633659, at *4 (owners set up a copyrighted website to advertise their
property). Use of a home-sharing website would also be advertising.
177
See La Cebadilla Estates, 2007 WL 5615085, at *4 (“Because [the owner] is a business, not an
individual, it is incapable of residing at the property; it can only conduct business there.”); Tarr, 510 S.W.3d at
730 (owner used an LLC to operate rental business).
178
See, e.g., La Cebadilla Estates, 2007 WL 5615085, at *4 (business owned a “portfolio of rental
homes”).
179
French, supra note 11, at 366.
180
See id. at 365–69.
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land. “People purchasing property in a common-interest community, which is
usually subject to specific use restrictions set forth in the declaration, are not
likely to expect that the association would be able, under a generally worded
rulemaking power, to impose additional use restrictions on their property.”181
There is a similar rationale for making declaration amendment difficult.182 The
Restatement and UCIOA recognize a power to adopt rules preventing nuisances
that unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of property,183 and
although some short-term-rental properties might create a private nuisance,184
this theory would not affect the more far-reaching harms that short-term rentals
have produced.185
Some jurisdictions have recognized broader community-association
rulemaking authority, including rules affecting short-term rentals,186 but such
standards of review give dubious protections to owners in common-interest
communities.187 Using residential use covenants to regulate short-term rentals
rather than expanding rulemaking authority would be more in line with owners’
expectations about how new use restrictions are imposed and would require no
modification of existing common-interest community statutes. Likewise,
reading such covenants to reach only short-term-rental activity that clearly
amounts to commercial use ensures that the same expectations are not
undermined by the courts.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, this limited judicial review would not
let community associations off the hook. It is not the province of the courts to
draft common-interest community covenants. Instead, it is essential that the
governing documents of any common-interest community clearly address
rentals of every type, whether the community or its developer wants to allow all

181

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.7 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
“The declaration for a common-interest community functions like a constitution for the community.
Like a constitution, the declaration should not be subject to change upon temporary impulse. . . . The varying
approval requirements are designed to address the tension between providing the flexibility required for longterm viability of the community and providing safeguards for the reliance interests of those who find themselves
in the minority.” Id. § 6.10 cmt. a.
183
See id. § 6.7; UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-120(f)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
184
See, e.g., Walker, supra note 34; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D, Reporter’s Note
(AM. LAW INST. 1979) (listing examples of successful private nuisance claims).
185
See Part I, supra.
186
See, e.g., Watts v. Oak Shores Cmty. Ass’n, 235 Cal. App. 4th 466, 472–75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)
(upholding rules establishing a minimum seven-day rental period and an annual fee for owners who rent their
properties). See generally Kress, supra note 76.
187
See generally Lewis A. Schiller, Limitations on the Enforceability of Condominium Rules, 22 STETSON
L. REV. 1133, 1140–52 (1993) (examining a few theories of deference to condominium association rulemaking).
182
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rentals, prohibit them entirely, or do something in between.188 The community
association is best positioned to address the particular needs of their community;
the judicial option is costly, time consuming, and unreliable, even if the
common-interest community is sited in a sympathetic jurisdiction; and shortterm rentals can be quite disruptive within the community or a larger geographic
area. There is no excuse for a newly formed community not to address shortterm rentals, for it is exceedingly simple to do so;189 and although amending the
CC&Rs is difficult for existing communities, it should be easier to gain the votes
of community members if short-term rentals are truly disruptive.
IV. COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITIES CAN AND SHOULD
REGULATE SHORT-TERM RENTALS
The reform proposed in Part III would be an important step toward reining
in short-term rentals to manageable levels and counteracting the negative
externalities discussed in Part I. Moreover, common-interest communities are
better situated for short-term-rental regulation than cities or municipalities and
would be a valuable supplement to government efforts. Although many local
governments have made an effort to regulate short-term rentals, they have
largely fallen short in effectively enforcing those regulations. The structure and
scope of common-interest communities make enforcement of short-term-rental
regulations more likely to occur. These communities provide homes for a large
proportion of the population and are often located within cities struggling with
short-term rentals, meaning regulation in this form would likely have a
meaningful impact.190
A. Inadequate Governmental Regulation
The negative externalities created by a high volume of short-term rentals
persist despite the earnest efforts of local and state governments. Many cities,
including those discussed in Part I, regulate short-term rentals, ban them entirely,
or are considering extensive regulations of the activity.191 In theory, these
188

See Section III.A, supra.
See id.
190
See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
191
See generally Lara Major, Comment, There’s No Place Like (Your) Home: Evaluating Existing Models
and Proposing Solutions for Room-Sharing Regulation, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 469 (2016) (survey of modern
local, state, and private regulations; case studies of New York, San Francisco, and Portland); Ashley M. Peterson,
Sharing Space, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2017, at 28 (focusing on California cities’ regulation of short-term rentals;
briefly discussing New York City regulations). Here are a few examples of existing local regulation of shortterm rentals:
(1) New York City, New York, prohibits rental of permanent residential multiple dwellings for fewer
189
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regulation and licensing schemes should curtail short-term rentals to levels
acceptable to the needs of a particular city; however, in many cases they have
proved inadequate.192 For example, the San Francisco Planning Department
described the task as a “nightmare,” partly due to the refusal of Airbnb to release
data on hosts.193 Some commentators have suggested ways by which local
governments could improve regulation of short-term rentals.194 But even if
companies such as Airbnb were to disclose the personal details of their host
users,195 or if other suggestions for improving regulations were implemented,
government agencies would still be faced with the large task of enforcing their
laws. In light of the shortcomings of traditional government regulation of shortterm rentals, common-interest communities may be a welcome source of
supplemental regulation that can fill in the gaps where governments have failed.

than thirty days. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(8)(a) (McKinney 2011) (“‘[P]ermanent residence
purposes’ shall consist of occupancy of a dwelling unit by the same natural person or family for
thirty consecutive days or more . . . .”); Brookford, LLC v. Penraat, 8 N.Y.S.3d 859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2014); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-287.1 (2017) (unlawful to advertise any use that is not permanent
residence purposes).
(2) Carlsbad, California, only permits short-term rentals within certain geographic areas and imposes
licensing, taxing, and operational requirements on lawful short-term renters. See CARLSBAD, CAL.,
MUN. CODE ch. 5.60 (2017), http://www.qcode.us/codes/carlsbad/.
(3) Santa Monica, California, allows “home-sharing,” or rental when the host is living on-site throughout
the visitor’s stay, but prohibits “vacation rentals,” or rentals for exclusive transient use for fewer
than thirty days, in permanent residential occupancy zones. See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE
ch. 6.20 (2017), http://www.qcode.us/codes/santamonica/; see also SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN.
CODE § 9.51.030(B)(15)(c) (2017), http://www.qcode.us/codes/santamonica/ (classifying “vacation
rentals” as “commercial use”).
(4) Portland, Oregon, grants permits only for “accessory short-term rentals,” where the primary use of
the dwelling is long-term occupancy and only part of the dwelling is used for short-term rental. What
Is an Accessory Short-Term Rental (ASTR)?, PORTLAND DEV. SERVS., https://www.portlandoregon.
gov/bds/article/518658 (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
192
See, e.g., Katie Benner, A Brooklyn Neighborhood Where Airbnb Is Being Put to the Test, N.Y. TIMES
(July 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/technology/a-brooklyn-neighborhood-where-airbnb-isbeing-put-to-the-test.html?_r=0. (“[A] report found that 55 percent of the 51,000 or so Airbnb listings in New
York City violated a state law that prohibits rental or a residential with three or more units for less than 30 days
unless the permanent resident is present.”); Jay Barmann, Airbnb Law Impossible to Enforce, Says Agency
Tasked with Enforcement, SFIST (Mar. 23, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://sfist.com/2015/03/23/airbnb_
law_impossible_to_enforce_sa.php [http://perma.cc/H82B-UF8Q] (San Francisco Planning Department faced
with “registration nightmare” to enforce ninety-day rental cap; Airbnb would not release data on hosts, making
rental activity very difficult to track); Lori Weisberg, Airbnb Spawns Vacation Rental Confusion, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/tourism/sdut-airbnbvacation-rental-growth-causing-confusion-2015mar08-story.html (rental companies, homeowners, and local
jurisdictions faced with “bewildering array of regulations”).
193
Barmann, supra note 192.
194
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17; Major, supra note 191, at 500–04.
195
See Major, supra note 191, at 500–01.
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B. Common-Interest Communities Are Suited to Regulate Short-Term Rentals
Common-interest community members live under several layers of
governance. The state legislature enacts one or several common-interest
community statutes; the community’s developer creates the community’s
declaration (and perhaps bylaws and rules); and the community association,
managed by its board, promulgates bylaws and rules.196 These communities also
host a struggle between a number of dueling principles.197 For example,
traditional property rules give owners an expectation that they may use their
property freely as long as it does not interfere with their neighbors’ use and
enjoyment, and the common law disfavored servitudes that interfered with free
use, especially when successors in interest became involved.198 Yet an owner
who buys into a common-interest community enters into a contractual obligation
whereby certain property rights and freedoms are sacrificed to gain benefits
enjoyed by all community members.199 Within this contractual obligation, the
law attempts to accommodate the desires of the majority, the rights of the few,
the need for the community to adapt, and the judgment of the association and
the board.200 A theme of modern statutory approaches to achieving balance is to
grant broad power to regulate communities before any units are sold, but to limit
that power to varying degrees once a sale has been made.201 Of course, whether
this works in practice is up for debate.202
Given the amalgam of doctrines influencing common-interest community
law, this model has been said to “occupy a space that lies somewhere between
public governments and private businesses or associations.”203 Common-interest
196

See Part II, supra.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6, Introductory Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(“Three strands of law come together in the law governing residential common-interest communities: the law of
servitudes; the law governing the forms of ownership used in the community; and the law governing the vehicle
used in the community for management of commonly held property or provision of services. Servitudes underlie
all common-interest communities, regardless of the ownership and organizational forms used.”).
198
See id. §§ 4.1, 6.7 cmt. b. The Restatement takes the position that common law restrictions on servitudes
should be removed: horizontal privity, touch and concern, and similar doctrines should be abolished, and the
intent of the parties should always govern interpretation of servitudes rather than a predilection for the free use
of land. See id. § 4.1 cmt. a.
199
See 31 C.J.S. Estates § 232 (2018); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6, Introductory
Note.
200
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6, Introductory Note.
201
See Part II, supra.
202
See generally Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, supra note 60 (arguing that condominium
rulemaking power may be too broad).
203
French, supra note 11, at 361; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6, Introductory
Note (“Like local governments, community associations have the power to make rules governing some behavior
within the community, and the power to enforce the rules with fines and other penalties. They also have the
197
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communities have regulations and provide services that resemble public
government, but they are structured around private contracts and corporate
models of organization.204 Yet common-interest communities are not profitdriven, and they are permitted to influence residents’ lives in more invasive ways
than cities.205 And most importantly for the subject of this Comment, the
intimacy of common-interest communities suggests that enforcement of rules is
more likely and may be more effective than city ordinances or state laws.206 This
is partly due to size—these are “communities,” after all, not cities, and thus there
are usually fewer residents to manage.207 Communities also have fewer
regulations to keep track of because the county or city the community is sited
within will handle fire, police, taxes, schools, and other services. Additionally,
every property owner, as well as the association, has the power to enforce the
CC&Rs, and associations often hire companies to address complaints or conduct
inspections.208 Unlike a government agency, residents of common-interest
communities have a personal stake in ensuring that the rules are enforced for the
sake of common areas, the use and enjoyment of their own property, and the
property values of the community. Whether acting individually or as an
association, these residents have many incentives to follow through with
enforcement and the power to do so.
There is other evidence that enforcement of short-term-rental restrictions
could be more effective if implemented closer to the ground. Many efforts to
control rentals have come from residents who are worried about the effects of
short-term rentals on their property and neighborhood.209 And when government
power to enforce the servitudes through judicial action. Like local governments, associations often administer
land-use regulations and provide utility services to their members. Unlike local governments, however,
association charters are created by private contract and, absent other circumstances, the associations’ actions are
not state action sufficient to subject them to challenge under the United States Constitution or § 1983 liability.”).
204
See French, supra note 11, at 361–64.
205
See id. at 364.
206
See id.
207
For example, the average number of units in a California common-interest community is around 100,
and 68% of communities have 50 units or fewer. California CID Stats and Figures, VISION 34–35 (2014),
https://www.cacm.org/Resources/IndustryData2014.pdf (CACM, the organization that published the statistics,
uses the term “common-interest development” (CID)). Thus, 68% of common-interest communities are smaller
than the least populated towns in the state (around 200 residents). California Very Small Towns and Villages
(Fewer than 1000 Residents), CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/California3.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2019). By contrast, Silver Lake, a neighborhood in Los Angeles, has over 30,000 residents. Silver Lake,
L.A. TIMES, http://maps.latimes.com/neighborhoods/neighborhood/silver-lake/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
208
French, supra note 11, at 364; see also Heather Kelly, Meet the Airbnb Police, CNN (Oct. 1, 2016,
9:50 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/01/technology/airbnb-police/index.html (private investigation
companies being hired by “[l]andlords, apartment managers, and condo associations” to catch illegal rentals;
one company, BNB Shield, uses software to identify potential violations).
209
See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
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programs dedicated to the issue are implemented, enforcement may be primarily
driven by resident complaints rather than the investigative efforts of the people
in charge.210 Given individual or collective power to shut down short-term
rentals, residents would not have to rely on bureaucracy—and the commoninterest community model gives residents that ability.211
CONCLUSION
Short-term rentals provide substantial benefits to their proprietors and the
many lucrative websites that facilitate them. However, they also cause problems
for cities and individuals. Unfortunately, local governments that have tried to
regulate short-term rentals to varying degrees have found their goals difficult to
accomplish due to roadblocks that are not easily cleared. The common-interest
community model, on the other hand, could effectively enforce short-term-rental
restrictions, but many of these communities feel like they are unable to do so
because of a difficult declaration amendment process and an inability to find
relief in the courts.
The best solution to this problem is to increase the clarity and precision with
which common-interest community governing documents address short-term
rentals. A newly formed common-interest community must include a welldrafted rental provision in its declaration, and existing communities should try
to resolve the issue internally by amending their declarations to do the same.
Additionally, communities that find themselves unable to amend their
declaration should be able to exclude some short-term-rental activity via
residential use covenants, which many common-interest communities have in
their declaration already. Although short-term rentals are not per se incompatible
with residential use, many property owners are creating de facto hotels that are
unambiguous commercial ventures. With a simple shift in judicial interpretation,
which has already occurred in a small number of jurisdictions, common-interest
communities would be equipped to eradicate the most harmful instances of
short-term-rental activity, and residents would not be unfairly stripped of their
right to infrequently rent out their homes. Meanwhile, more nuanced regulation
of rentals would still be left up to community associations and local government.

210
See Policy Analysis Report from Fred Brousseau, supra note 36 (“[A]pproximately 92.2 percent of
[the Office of Short-Term Rentals’] 322 enforcement cases active since February 2015, . . . were generated by
complaints (274) or referrals (23) from other City departments.”).
211
Cf. HYATT, supra note 51. Of course, it is neither feasible nor desirable for every housing unit in every
city to be a part of a common-interest community, and whether grassroots enforcement of short-term-rental bans
would be effective in practice is a question outside the scope of this Comment.
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Although the proposal of this Comment would certainly not solve the shortterm-rental problem, it would be a significant step toward that end.
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